The readings for this discussion generated several questions in my mind. Brown (1991) as well as Maril (2001) and Schacter (2001) provided explorations of this phenomenon leaving me thoroughly unsatisfied and confused; I wanted to know more about emotionality and if it was actually a necessary component of TOT. What are the conditions (on both a personal and social level) that produce a sense of urgency for the individual? Is TOT determined relative to the social environment, or is it conditioned by personal cognitive functioning? Although the various direct-access theories address some of these questions, the methodology applied does not seem conducive to accurate results. I considered the subject’s dependence on how he/she contemplates the target word, and that the shift from general to more specific detail represents a difference in how much—as well as in what way—attention is commanded to the target. The cognitive strategy comprises a process of breaking down one’s comprehensive analysis (schema) of a certain target. Subsequently, I questioned the role of familiarity and recognition. To have truly invoked a TOT, should the subject be able to recognize that he/she is familiar with the target word but for whatever reason he/she is unable to recall it presently? What exactly is the relationship between interference and TOT? I thought about how I have experienced TOT in the past, both subjectively and through interaction or observation of peers, and I realized that there was usually a strong resistance to admitting that one did not know or could not eventually recall the target word. There is something to be examined when considering the competitive nature that can arise when one is in a social setting (i.e. when multiple individuals are trying to recall the same target).
When Brown (1991) discussed investigations that have studied TOTs in children, I didn’t understand how scientists could even attempt to analyze this. During such early stages of linguistic development it seems futile to conduct such experimentation—how can one even tell if they kids are just having difficulty with pronunciation or if they are actually experiencing TOT?
By the time I had read these first three articles, I felt there was a necessity to establish distinct ramifications of the TOT state because there are too many gray areas. We must acknowledge that not everyone is going to experience it in the same way while establishing what exactly distinguishes it from a “feeling of knowing” state. I felt that TOT hinged on this sense of necessity to retrieve the information that is psychologically determined by the individual as well as his/her environment. The conundrum hinges on these two binary conditions: the desired information can remain in one’s realm of consciousness and remain accessible without extensive effort at certain times, but under other circumstances one can feel utterly helpless until it later arises, often when one’s attention is not focused on retrieval. It was not until examining Schwartz’s (1999) article that I felt these topics were appropriately addressed. He brings up extremely relevant aspects that must be considered; his discussion of Tulving’s (1989) critique of the doctrine of concordance is essentially what the other articles seem to gloss over. Tulving emphasized the difference between “the cognitive process of ‘retrieval’” and “the experience of ‘recollection’” based on the notion that one is representative of behavior while the other is of phenomenology. Theorists have often assumed that the cognitive processes involved in these are the same, but Tulving (and Schwartz) deny this. Positing that we are not consciously aware of this process of retrieval, Schwartz elaborates that it “may not be accompanied by a feeling that recollection from memory has occurred” (380). Phenomenology implies that feeling accompanies cognition, and it seems that approaching TOT in this light would be more appropriate. Schwartz concludes by support of metacognitive theories that although these processes may not be one and the same, experimental results have shown that they are most likely linked. He even states that this association “may occur only because of features of the external environment” (390). I think that further research should be conducted according to the metacognitive approaches. Clearly TOT can be invoked in laboratory settings, but I think it has a lot to do with how significant the target word is for the individual relative to their environment, and perhaps it is more appropriate to study this phenomenon as it manifests itself everyday. Realizing that one cannot recall a piece of information that was previously recalled is different from having a similar realization with an affective reaction. It all depends on how the individual attaches value and perceives such meaning relative to time and place.
Wednesday, October 24, 2007
Monday, October 22, 2007
Ironic Relief
Up to this point our class readings have mainly revolved around broad ideas in memory research—different levels of memory, recall and retrieval. We have also studied anomalies and irregularities such as amnesia and synesthesia. And while the ideas seem concrete at face value, truly understanding their nature has yielded less than solid results, and we are often left to rely on inference and interpretation. How ironic it is, then, that the study of such a frustrating experience as the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon could be so satisfying. I found this week’s readings “satisfying” for a few reasons.
Firstly, all the readings worked together by providing different viewpoints of the same subject. While Schwartz offered an array of theories explaining the etiology of TOT, the Maril study gave sound neurological evidence linking certain parts of the brain (the anterior cingulated cortex and lateral prefrontal cortex) to the processes of conflict detection and retrieval monitoring that accompany TOT. And Schacter does what he does best—presenting cognitive theory, neurological study, and human story together in a cohesive text. Just as there are many interweaving ways to interpret TOT data, there are many ways in which these readings support each other and enrich our overall understanding. Unlike many other subjects in memory research, TOT lends itself easily to examination in multiple fields of study.
And speaking of examination, TOT is a pleasure because it can be so well studied in the laboratory. The factors are not only easy to control, but also easy to calculate. The results are definitive—one either knows, doesn’t know, or has TOT, and factors such as time and cues are easily quantifiable.
Another reason why TOT study is so satisfying is because it tends to ring true. It is a universal phenomenon, meaning that everyone exactly what TOT feels like. Unlike other specific phenomena such as amnesia, we all have personal experience with TOT, which we can reflect upon when evaluating different theories. It is pleasing to find that the findings and theories of well-respected experts of psychology, neurology, and cognitive science match up with your own intuitions on the same subject. Even the technical psychological term, “tip-of-the-tongue,” is intuitive, having originated from colloquial usage. TOT study is utterly accessible.
While it is safe to assume that TOT is universal, it is evident from the readings that there are many differing views and theories on why it occurs. As someone with a lifetime of experience with TOT, which theories most ring true for you? How exactly do you explain this feeling with which you are so familiar?
Firstly, all the readings worked together by providing different viewpoints of the same subject. While Schwartz offered an array of theories explaining the etiology of TOT, the Maril study gave sound neurological evidence linking certain parts of the brain (the anterior cingulated cortex and lateral prefrontal cortex) to the processes of conflict detection and retrieval monitoring that accompany TOT. And Schacter does what he does best—presenting cognitive theory, neurological study, and human story together in a cohesive text. Just as there are many interweaving ways to interpret TOT data, there are many ways in which these readings support each other and enrich our overall understanding. Unlike many other subjects in memory research, TOT lends itself easily to examination in multiple fields of study.
And speaking of examination, TOT is a pleasure because it can be so well studied in the laboratory. The factors are not only easy to control, but also easy to calculate. The results are definitive—one either knows, doesn’t know, or has TOT, and factors such as time and cues are easily quantifiable.
Another reason why TOT study is so satisfying is because it tends to ring true. It is a universal phenomenon, meaning that everyone exactly what TOT feels like. Unlike other specific phenomena such as amnesia, we all have personal experience with TOT, which we can reflect upon when evaluating different theories. It is pleasing to find that the findings and theories of well-respected experts of psychology, neurology, and cognitive science match up with your own intuitions on the same subject. Even the technical psychological term, “tip-of-the-tongue,” is intuitive, having originated from colloquial usage. TOT study is utterly accessible.
While it is safe to assume that TOT is universal, it is evident from the readings that there are many differing views and theories on why it occurs. As someone with a lifetime of experience with TOT, which theories most ring true for you? How exactly do you explain this feeling with which you are so familiar?
October 24 Blog
Burke and MacKay’s ideas on retrieved information also intrigued me as I came to see it in my experiment subjects, and myself, in the TOT test. It was almost frustrating, this clinging to a familiar name even though I KNEW it was wrong. But when I would force it out of my mind, it was almost as if I was staring at a blank blackboard. I had nothing to go on. My other subjects felt the same way. One of them even told himself to, “forget that one!” I observed similar reactions to the TOT feeling that Catie did with her subjects. They would return and repeat the information they already knew about the actors, rather then try to cue up new information. This did not work for me in helping to cue up the name, but it did work for one of my subjects. This could be because I did get frustrated because I knew what I was doing, knew that I was simply repeating the same thing over and over, and thus getting nowhere. Who’s to say that if I just focused on the information instead of my feelings, I would have been able, like my subject, to retrieve the name.
An interesting topic came up this weekend with a few friends that relates to memory and how we view our own memories. One of my friends explains his memory as an office filled with filing cabinets, but the cabinets aren’t labeled, which is why he sometimes gets his memories mixed up and has a hard time retrieving certain ones. I thought that theory related to Augustine’s comparison between his memory and a great harbor. It also made me realize that I have never visualized my memory, or attempted to. Maybe this has something to do with my preference for auditory learning. Sounds and the way I hear things tend to make a greater impact then images. I have never thought of my memory as something else, or given it an image. I was wondering if this, giving memory an image, is common, and what types of images do we give?
An interesting topic came up this weekend with a few friends that relates to memory and how we view our own memories. One of my friends explains his memory as an office filled with filing cabinets, but the cabinets aren’t labeled, which is why he sometimes gets his memories mixed up and has a hard time retrieving certain ones. I thought that theory related to Augustine’s comparison between his memory and a great harbor. It also made me realize that I have never visualized my memory, or attempted to. Maybe this has something to do with my preference for auditory learning. Sounds and the way I hear things tend to make a greater impact then images. I have never thought of my memory as something else, or given it an image. I was wondering if this, giving memory an image, is common, and what types of images do we give?
Sunday, October 21, 2007
October 24th Post---TOT
I felt that the most compelling aspect of this week’s reading was the discussion of various brain-imaging techniques used to illustrate the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon. Though it seems as if the neural systems that causes TOT, as pointed out by Maril, Wagner, and Schacter, the evidence that has been discovered so far makes it very clear that there are distinct neurological patterns of activation that occur during TOT. I was particularly intrigued by the fact that TOT retrieval failures are accompanied by activation in the anterior-cingulate prefrontal cortices, a region of the brain that is involved in a metacognitive conflict. This is especially interesting because in my initial readings about tip-of-the-tongue, I never considered it as much of a neural conflict as I did a failure of a sufficient connection. For example, one of the readings (unfortunately, I cannot locate the place where I read this) mentioned the idea of a memory involving TOT not being able to produce a neural connection that is strong enough to enable a full recall. Conceiving of TOT failures as a meetacognitive conflict between the individual’s confidence in the existence of the knowledge and the cognitive level is an interesting challenge to my own previous views on tip-of-the-tongue.
I am interested to see what future research on the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon will reveal, particularly in terms of the neurological aspects. Schwartz’s very brief introduction to the neuropsychological approach mentioned that such approaches have investigated TOT in populations with conditions such as Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s, and aphasics. Though the research is still, at this point, limited, it is my hope that further research will be able to clarify just what mechanisms specifically underlie TOT.
On a fairly unrelated note, I also found it particularly interesting that TOT occurs more often with proper nouns, especially names, than other types of words. Schacter discusses this concept in depth in The Seven Sins of Memory, especially the idea of associations. For example, patients would be able to recall that someone is a baker more easily than their name because the concept of baker brings to mind a wide array of images. He also discussed a study in which patients were able to more easily recall names such as Grumpy, Snow White, and Scrooge, which have personality and physical implications in the names themselves. It made me wonder about how often this happens in more personal situations, like if you meet someone named Mary who looks like Mary Poppins. I’m curious if one’s own knowledge and perceptions can influence name blocking in this way as strongly as more concrete associations can.
I am interested to see what future research on the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon will reveal, particularly in terms of the neurological aspects. Schwartz’s very brief introduction to the neuropsychological approach mentioned that such approaches have investigated TOT in populations with conditions such as Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s, and aphasics. Though the research is still, at this point, limited, it is my hope that further research will be able to clarify just what mechanisms specifically underlie TOT.
On a fairly unrelated note, I also found it particularly interesting that TOT occurs more often with proper nouns, especially names, than other types of words. Schacter discusses this concept in depth in The Seven Sins of Memory, especially the idea of associations. For example, patients would be able to recall that someone is a baker more easily than their name because the concept of baker brings to mind a wide array of images. He also discussed a study in which patients were able to more easily recall names such as Grumpy, Snow White, and Scrooge, which have personality and physical implications in the names themselves. It made me wonder about how often this happens in more personal situations, like if you meet someone named Mary who looks like Mary Poppins. I’m curious if one’s own knowledge and perceptions can influence name blocking in this way as strongly as more concrete associations can.
is there possibility for spontaneous retrieval?
The Malin, Wagner, Schacter article writes that the TOT state is marked by recovery of partial information from long term memory. This leads to a sense of familiarity about the target trying to be retrieved. However, this familiarity does not actually help to retrieve the target information. The article states that the familiarity does not produce a coherent enough body of information about the target to aid in retrieval, and thus the retrieval effort is led to failure. In fact, some of the information retrieved that leads to this sense of familiarity may be related to the target in such a way that retrieving the target information actually becomes more difficult.
Burke & MacKay elaborate on the idea of retrieved information prolonging the TOT state in the Schacter article when the “ugly sister” theory of blocking during the TOT state is discussed. Schacter writes that “often we tend to embrace the ugly sisters because they provide a comforting feeling of being “close” to the target and thus reassure us that we are about to resolve the TOT.” I noted examples of this in my own subjects when they were in a TOT state. One subject continued to repeat the name “Angela Lansbury” to himself while trying to recall the name “Annette Bening”. This repetition did not serve to help him ever remember the name Annette Bening, but, still, he continued to return to the non-target name. The sense of familiarity discussed by Marlin, Wagner, & Schacter in their TOT paper is not exactly what Schacter is discussing when he refers to the “ugly sister”. However, I think that the ugly sister model is useful in understanding how seemingly related and coherent information (which leads to the feeling of familiarity generated during the TOT state) can actually mislead a person trying to retrieve a target information. For example I noted that subjects were prone to repeating information about the target that was retrieved, rather than attempting to retrieve new information about the target. For example when trying to retrieve the name “Ben Stiller” the subject would return to the movies that the actor had been in, listing them off or trying to imagine what the movie cover looked like. Although these attempted cues had already been (unsuccessfully) tried before, the subject continued to return to them for aid.
I thought that this idea of retrieval of related information (and sometimes unrelated, as with the case of ugly sister information) actually inhibiting the retrieval of the target information was really interesting. Schacter speaks quite a bit to the idea of semantic organization and why retrieval of information related to the character of a proper noun does not help to retrieve that noun due to the lack of coherent connect and to the abstract nature of the connotation between the actual sound of the target and the information that is retrieved while searching for the target. It is, therefore, not surprising to note that the information that is retrieved is not used at all to actually retrieve the target information. Schacter states that one third of TOTs are resolved by a spontaneous or involuntary “pop up” of the target information. He states, however, that these spontaneous retrievals are probably not spontaneous. His evidence for this is that in a lab setting subjects who narrate their thoughts have traceable cues for the target retrieval. This information somewhat frustrated me. Firstly I felt like in this case what was found in the lab setting may not be cohesive with the way the retrieval works in the “real world”. Although I think that it is possible that there is external cuing which activate the retrieval of the target information, I think that it would be somewhat shortsighted to ignore the possibility which Schacter presents and then disagrees with: “the influence of ugly sisters has dissipates over time” and there is an “incubation process that operate[s] outside of awareness”. Perhaps the word spontaneous is not correct. Perhaps there is a cueing processes at hand. However, I would say that in “nature” rather than the cue for the retrieval coming from a stream of consciousness, as it does in the lab setting, the cue is so deeply embedded “outside of awareness” that there is no external stimulation- or traceable stimulation. It is purely internal, complicated, multi-faceted stimulation which leads to the retrieval of the target information. Overlooking this idea could possibly lead to overlooking a huge possibility for the way in which the mind stores and retrieves information, not to mention distinct ideas of how the mind works in general. Would it be so far fetched to think of a situation in which target information is retrieved during a dream, or in a similar state that lacks a coherent narrative-like state of consciousness? I know that Schacter is not saying that all cues are external. And he is certainly cannot be labeling the brain as so one dimensional. I suppose I just don’t see how without prescribing to these two views (external cuing and a “one dimensional” brain) he can rule out the possibility of spontaneous cuing.
Burke & MacKay elaborate on the idea of retrieved information prolonging the TOT state in the Schacter article when the “ugly sister” theory of blocking during the TOT state is discussed. Schacter writes that “often we tend to embrace the ugly sisters because they provide a comforting feeling of being “close” to the target and thus reassure us that we are about to resolve the TOT.” I noted examples of this in my own subjects when they were in a TOT state. One subject continued to repeat the name “Angela Lansbury” to himself while trying to recall the name “Annette Bening”. This repetition did not serve to help him ever remember the name Annette Bening, but, still, he continued to return to the non-target name. The sense of familiarity discussed by Marlin, Wagner, & Schacter in their TOT paper is not exactly what Schacter is discussing when he refers to the “ugly sister”. However, I think that the ugly sister model is useful in understanding how seemingly related and coherent information (which leads to the feeling of familiarity generated during the TOT state) can actually mislead a person trying to retrieve a target information. For example I noted that subjects were prone to repeating information about the target that was retrieved, rather than attempting to retrieve new information about the target. For example when trying to retrieve the name “Ben Stiller” the subject would return to the movies that the actor had been in, listing them off or trying to imagine what the movie cover looked like. Although these attempted cues had already been (unsuccessfully) tried before, the subject continued to return to them for aid.
I thought that this idea of retrieval of related information (and sometimes unrelated, as with the case of ugly sister information) actually inhibiting the retrieval of the target information was really interesting. Schacter speaks quite a bit to the idea of semantic organization and why retrieval of information related to the character of a proper noun does not help to retrieve that noun due to the lack of coherent connect and to the abstract nature of the connotation between the actual sound of the target and the information that is retrieved while searching for the target. It is, therefore, not surprising to note that the information that is retrieved is not used at all to actually retrieve the target information. Schacter states that one third of TOTs are resolved by a spontaneous or involuntary “pop up” of the target information. He states, however, that these spontaneous retrievals are probably not spontaneous. His evidence for this is that in a lab setting subjects who narrate their thoughts have traceable cues for the target retrieval. This information somewhat frustrated me. Firstly I felt like in this case what was found in the lab setting may not be cohesive with the way the retrieval works in the “real world”. Although I think that it is possible that there is external cuing which activate the retrieval of the target information, I think that it would be somewhat shortsighted to ignore the possibility which Schacter presents and then disagrees with: “the influence of ugly sisters has dissipates over time” and there is an “incubation process that operate[s] outside of awareness”. Perhaps the word spontaneous is not correct. Perhaps there is a cueing processes at hand. However, I would say that in “nature” rather than the cue for the retrieval coming from a stream of consciousness, as it does in the lab setting, the cue is so deeply embedded “outside of awareness” that there is no external stimulation- or traceable stimulation. It is purely internal, complicated, multi-faceted stimulation which leads to the retrieval of the target information. Overlooking this idea could possibly lead to overlooking a huge possibility for the way in which the mind stores and retrieves information, not to mention distinct ideas of how the mind works in general. Would it be so far fetched to think of a situation in which target information is retrieved during a dream, or in a similar state that lacks a coherent narrative-like state of consciousness? I know that Schacter is not saying that all cues are external. And he is certainly cannot be labeling the brain as so one dimensional. I suppose I just don’t see how without prescribing to these two views (external cuing and a “one dimensional” brain) he can rule out the possibility of spontaneous cuing.
TOT in Amnesiac Patients and Older Subjects.
I think in general I felt like there was a large amount of theory behind what might be the cause of this experience, but no real way to measure if recall is based on blockers or incomplete activation or any other theory. All of the theories presented in Schwartz's paper seem perfectly viable to me, so it feels like there is a definite lack of evidence to prove any of the theories. To me, a combination of absence of the correct cues and the presence of blockers seems logical. I feel like the general amount of data presented supports multiple theories, and are therefore inconclusive to support any one.
I experienced a large amount of frustration with Schwartz because he presents so many different viewpoints, but I felt no real backing for any of them. In general, I just want more data about the process that leads to TOT, and the resolution of the state. I think that it's relatively impossible to give more evidence for any theory with the technology and design of current experiments, but the article seemed more to define theories than to give real insight into the memory retrieval process.
One thing that intrigued me was the activation of parts of the right hemisphere normally associated with episodic memory in the retrieval of information to alleviate the TOT state. Of all of the arguments presented, the importance of episodic memory in determining the correct word makes the most sense. To recall, most people use episodic cues (such as what the actor looked like in the movie) in order to access the semantic memory. In earlier readings, we discussed a person's ability to use their semantic memory when their episodic memory is damaged. I now wonder how this lack of episodic memory affects the recall of a word in the TOT state. Furthermore, I wonder if a TOT state actually exists for amnesia patients, when they have a poor episodic memory. Very little is mentioned about the study of amnesiacs and the TOT state. I think the prevalence of this state would either decrease or increase depending on the damage and am interested to see in which cases the TOT state even still existed. The only issue I can find with studying amnesiacs and TOT is the possibility of too many variables as a result of their brain damage. Unless a full assessment of their general cognitive abilities is know, it may be difficult to differentiate between the two states. (TOT and general amnesia.)
Very few studies have been done focusing the correlation between age and the number of TOT states produced. Of those, there is a definite trend supporting that younger adults experience less of this phenomenon than do the elderly. However, I felt like it was generally assumed that this increase in TOT state was a direct result of memory deterioration, and not the information the individual has been exposed to. If the theory of blocking is correct, then wouldn't a larger amount of TOT states possibly be because of the greater amount of information that comes to mind when given a single cue? With age, we acquire more memory and more cues. Most of which, overlap in some fashion. Is it really because older people have a poorer memory, or because they have more information stored in their head and therefore harder to for them to find the correct word because there is too much interference. It's strange to me that while this observation between age and the occurences of the TOT state, there is no real investigation into why. I felt like there was just an assumption made that because they are older, their memory has deteriorated. However, the studies Schwartz refers to in his article only show that there is a difference between age groups, but very little evidence as to why.
I experienced a large amount of frustration with Schwartz because he presents so many different viewpoints, but I felt no real backing for any of them. In general, I just want more data about the process that leads to TOT, and the resolution of the state. I think that it's relatively impossible to give more evidence for any theory with the technology and design of current experiments, but the article seemed more to define theories than to give real insight into the memory retrieval process.
One thing that intrigued me was the activation of parts of the right hemisphere normally associated with episodic memory in the retrieval of information to alleviate the TOT state. Of all of the arguments presented, the importance of episodic memory in determining the correct word makes the most sense. To recall, most people use episodic cues (such as what the actor looked like in the movie) in order to access the semantic memory. In earlier readings, we discussed a person's ability to use their semantic memory when their episodic memory is damaged. I now wonder how this lack of episodic memory affects the recall of a word in the TOT state. Furthermore, I wonder if a TOT state actually exists for amnesia patients, when they have a poor episodic memory. Very little is mentioned about the study of amnesiacs and the TOT state. I think the prevalence of this state would either decrease or increase depending on the damage and am interested to see in which cases the TOT state even still existed. The only issue I can find with studying amnesiacs and TOT is the possibility of too many variables as a result of their brain damage. Unless a full assessment of their general cognitive abilities is know, it may be difficult to differentiate between the two states. (TOT and general amnesia.)
Very few studies have been done focusing the correlation between age and the number of TOT states produced. Of those, there is a definite trend supporting that younger adults experience less of this phenomenon than do the elderly. However, I felt like it was generally assumed that this increase in TOT state was a direct result of memory deterioration, and not the information the individual has been exposed to. If the theory of blocking is correct, then wouldn't a larger amount of TOT states possibly be because of the greater amount of information that comes to mind when given a single cue? With age, we acquire more memory and more cues. Most of which, overlap in some fashion. Is it really because older people have a poorer memory, or because they have more information stored in their head and therefore harder to for them to find the correct word because there is too much interference. It's strange to me that while this observation between age and the occurences of the TOT state, there is no real investigation into why. I felt like there was just an assumption made that because they are older, their memory has deteriorated. However, the studies Schwartz refers to in his article only show that there is a difference between age groups, but very little evidence as to why.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)