Wednesday, October 24, 2007

The phenomenological account of TOT

The readings for this discussion generated several questions in my mind. Brown (1991) as well as Maril (2001) and Schacter (2001) provided explorations of this phenomenon leaving me thoroughly unsatisfied and confused; I wanted to know more about emotionality and if it was actually a necessary component of TOT. What are the conditions (on both a personal and social level) that produce a sense of urgency for the individual? Is TOT determined relative to the social environment, or is it conditioned by personal cognitive functioning? Although the various direct-access theories address some of these questions, the methodology applied does not seem conducive to accurate results. I considered the subject’s dependence on how he/she contemplates the target word, and that the shift from general to more specific detail represents a difference in how much—as well as in what way—attention is commanded to the target. The cognitive strategy comprises a process of breaking down one’s comprehensive analysis (schema) of a certain target. Subsequently, I questioned the role of familiarity and recognition. To have truly invoked a TOT, should the subject be able to recognize that he/she is familiar with the target word but for whatever reason he/she is unable to recall it presently? What exactly is the relationship between interference and TOT? I thought about how I have experienced TOT in the past, both subjectively and through interaction or observation of peers, and I realized that there was usually a strong resistance to admitting that one did not know or could not eventually recall the target word. There is something to be examined when considering the competitive nature that can arise when one is in a social setting (i.e. when multiple individuals are trying to recall the same target).

When Brown (1991) discussed investigations that have studied TOTs in children, I didn’t understand how scientists could even attempt to analyze this. During such early stages of linguistic development it seems futile to conduct such experimentation—how can one even tell if they kids are just having difficulty with pronunciation or if they are actually experiencing TOT?

By the time I had read these first three articles, I felt there was a necessity to establish distinct ramifications of the TOT state because there are too many gray areas. We must acknowledge that not everyone is going to experience it in the same way while establishing what exactly distinguishes it from a “feeling of knowing” state. I felt that TOT hinged on this sense of necessity to retrieve the information that is psychologically determined by the individual as well as his/her environment. The conundrum hinges on these two binary conditions: the desired information can remain in one’s realm of consciousness and remain accessible without extensive effort at certain times, but under other circumstances one can feel utterly helpless until it later arises, often when one’s attention is not focused on retrieval. It was not until examining Schwartz’s (1999) article that I felt these topics were appropriately addressed. He brings up extremely relevant aspects that must be considered; his discussion of Tulving’s (1989) critique of the doctrine of concordance is essentially what the other articles seem to gloss over. Tulving emphasized the difference between “the cognitive process of ‘retrieval’” and “the experience of ‘recollection’” based on the notion that one is representative of behavior while the other is of phenomenology. Theorists have often assumed that the cognitive processes involved in these are the same, but Tulving (and Schwartz) deny this. Positing that we are not consciously aware of this process of retrieval, Schwartz elaborates that it “may not be accompanied by a feeling that recollection from memory has occurred” (380). Phenomenology implies that feeling accompanies cognition, and it seems that approaching TOT in this light would be more appropriate. Schwartz concludes by support of metacognitive theories that although these processes may not be one and the same, experimental results have shown that they are most likely linked. He even states that this association “may occur only because of features of the external environment” (390). I think that further research should be conducted according to the metacognitive approaches. Clearly TOT can be invoked in laboratory settings, but I think it has a lot to do with how significant the target word is for the individual relative to their environment, and perhaps it is more appropriate to study this phenomenon as it manifests itself everyday. Realizing that one cannot recall a piece of information that was previously recalled is different from having a similar realization with an affective reaction. It all depends on how the individual attaches value and perceives such meaning relative to time and place.

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